Over the past two to three decades economics has played an increasingly important role in the development of U.S. antitrust enforcement and policy. This essay first reviews the major facets of U.S. antitrust enforcement and next reviews the ways in which economics --starting from a low base --has grown in importance in antitrust. The essay then highlights three antitrust areas in which the influence of economics has had the greatest influence: merger analysis, vertical relationships, and predatory pricing. The essay concludes with the identification of four antitrust areas where further economics analysis could have high returns.
unwarranted creation and exercise of market power (which is often paraphrased as "monopoly power"). Competition and monopoly have been bedrock concepts in the liturgy of microeconomics for over a century. Therefore, the influence of economics on antitrust policy would seem to be a natural phenomenon.
As this essay illustrates, however, the influence of economics on antitrust is a relatively recent phenomenon; it was not considered to be so "natural" as recently as three or four decades ago.
As of the early 1960s, for example, the two enforcement agencies had few well-trained economists on their staffs, and the appearance of an economist as an expert in support or testifying on behalf of the plaintiffs or defendants in antitrust litigation was rare. Today, by contrast, both agencies have sizable staffs of well-trained economists, and most antitrust cases of any kind have economists involved on one or both sides. Indeed, in response to this "demand", a number of specialty antitrust economics consulting firms have arisen to offer a "supply".
The rest of this essay will expand on these developments, as follows: In Section II we will provide a brief overview of the antitrust laws. Section III will trace the growth of the influence of economics and economists over the past century. Section IV will pay special attention to three areas on which economics has had the most influence --merger analysis, vertical restraints, and predatory pricing. Section V offers a brief conclusion and highlights some areas where further economic analysis could still yield high returns.
II. A Brief Overview of U.S. Antitrust Policy
There are three major thrusts to modern antitrust enforcement in the U.S.:
3 First are the efforts to prevent "collusion": explicit price fixing or bid rigging or cartel formation. 4 These efforts mostly consist of law suits brought by the DOJ and by private parties under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which forbids "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations..."
Violations of the Sherman Act are felonies, which means that the DOJ can seek jail terms against individuals and sizable fines against companies. Private parties that claim to have been harmed directly by price-fixers can also bring suits (regardless of whether there have been any suits by the DOJ or FTC), with any proven damages being automatically trebled.
Second are efforts to prevent mergers, where their effect would be to cause a significant lessening of competition. These are primarily suits brought by the DOJ or the FTC under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which forbids mergers "where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." The goal of such a suit is simply to gain an injunction to stop the merger from proceeding.
5
Third are efforts to restrain the unilateral exercise of market power by a seller (or a buyer).
These are suits that can be brought by the DOJ, the FTC, or private parties. Section 2 of the Sherman Act (under which suits by the DOJ and private parties are authorized), forbids acts that "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize... any part of the trade or commerce among the Several States, or with foreign nations..." Again, the Sherman Act allows felony convictions, although the Robinson-Patman Act. 4 Although most antitrust enforcement efforts are phrased in terms of preventing anti-competitive acts by sellers, antitrust enforcement applies (in principle) equally to anti-competitive acts by buyers (and thus to the exercise of monopsony power as well as monopoly power). 5 Such suits may be settled by agreements by the merging parties to divest sufficient assets so as to maintain a sufficiently competitive environment. DOJ more often brings civil suits that seek injunctions in this area. And, again, private trebledamages lawsuits can be brought.
In addition, the FTC has, under the auspices of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the ability to prevent "unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." And, finally, the DOJ, the FTC, and private parties can bring suits aimed at tying, bundling, exclusive dealing, and similar vertical restraints under the auspices of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which forbids efforts "to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods....within the United States....or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods....of a competitor or competitors....where the effect....may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
In addition to prosecuting antitrust law violations, the DOJ and the FTC pursue procompetition policies in three other, less well known ways: First, they frequently file "amicus" (friend of the court) briefs in privately filed antitrust cases that have reached appellate levels, especially cases reaching the Supreme Court. Since the number of private cases filed annually is approximately ten times the number of cases brought by the two enforcement agencies (Viscusi et al. 2005, p. 72) , and private cases can yield legal precedents that are as binding as agency-filed cases, these amicus briefs give the agencies the opportunity to "lobby" the courts in favor of procompetitive decisions.
Second, the DOJ and FTC engage in "competition advocacy": the advocacy of procompetitive policies for other federal agencies in regulatory proceedings and for the 50 states in their regulatory actions. For example, in the past few years both the DOJ and the FTC have been urging the states (with only partial success) to eschew regulatory policies that would protect "full-service" residential real estate brokers from the competition offered by "discount" brokers. 6 Third, as other countries (especially in the wake of the transition of Eastern European countries to market-oriented economies) have become more interested in developing antitrust policies of their own, the two U.S. enforcement agencies have provided international advice and technical assistance.
III. Economics and Economists' Involvement in Antitrust --A Brief History 7
The influence of economics on antitrust has occurred along three paths: (a) advances in economics thinking --as expressed in theoretical developments and empirical testing --about the microeconomics that undergirds antitrust; (b) the direct involvement of economists in antitrust litigation and policy development at the enforcement agencies and in the service of private parties that have been plaintiffs or defendants in antitrust cases; and (c) economists' writings about specific antitrust cases, including those in which they provided litigation support. This section will trace these three paths.
A. The development of economics thinking.
Prior to the 1930s it would be difficult to identify a body of economics thought that could be identified as "industrial organization" (IO).
8 By the end of the 1930s, however, the field was starting 6 See, for example, Hahn et al. (2006) and White (2006b) . 7 This section draws on parts of .
8 I have been unable to determine when the phrase "industrial organization" was first used to describe the specific field of microeconomics that has now come to be associated with that phrase or when the phrase came into common use for describing the field. I have found a 1937 journal article title that comes close: "The Organization of Industry and the Theory of Prices" (Burns 1937) . Marshall (1920, Book IV, chs . VIII-XII)) does have five chapters that have the words "industrial organization" in their titles; but these chapters focus on issues of the firm (such as economies and diseconomies of scale) rather than on issues of industry and markets. Schumpeter (1954, pp. 948-950) , in discussing the "contributions of the applied fields" to the development of economics thought "from 1870 to 1914 (and later)" briefly discusses the category of "railroads, public utilities, 'trusts,' to coalesce and take shape.
9 Partly this was due to the influence of Edward Mason at Harvard (Mason 1939 (Mason , 1957 Richard Caves), and partly this was due to the industrial data collection and analyses that emerged from the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC).
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The field continued to develop over the next few decades. By the 1950s the structureconduct-performance (S-C-P) model --with the central role of seller concentration as a determinant of industry conduct and performance --was the mainstay of IO thinking. In addition, formal thinking about oligopoly (e.g., Chamberlin 1929 Chamberlin , 1956 Fellner 1949 , Stigler 1964 , aided by insights from game theory (e.g., Shubik 1959; Schelling 1960 ) and especially the "prisoner's dilemma", helped support the central role of concentration. The role of entry in the model gained prominence in the 1950s (Bain 1954 (Bain , 1956 . Empirical testing of the relationship between industry and cartels"; but all of his discussion is focused on railroad and public utility economics. See more generally the discussion in De Jong and Shepherd (2007) . 9 In 1942 when a collection of articles was published by the AEA (1942), titled Readings in the Social Control of Industry and reprinting a collection of 15 articles on IO-oriented topics that were published between 1934 and 1940, none of the articles had "industrial organization" in its title, although the Burns (1937) article was among them; but the "Preface" to the volume (Homan 1942, pp. v-vi) mentioned that the selection of the articles followed "the principle of confining attention to the more general problems of public policy toward industrial organization and control..." See also Peltzman (2007) . 10 See Shepherd (2007) ; and see De Jong and Shepherd (2007) more generally for minibiographies of some of the leading figures in IO during the 1930s and after.
11 The TNEC was created by an act of Congress in June 1938 and ended in April 1941. In its three years of existence it generated 37 volumes of testimony, two volumes of recommendations, and 43 monographs. Its data collection efforts provided the precedent for the Census of Manufactures, which first published data for 1947. For an example of its monographs, see Wilcox (1940) .
profit rates as a dependent variable and structural characteristics of the various industries as the independent variables, using the Censuses of Manufactures as the central data source, provided empirical support for the model (Bain 1951) , as did a large number of industry study monographs.
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By the end of the 1950s, Bain's (1959) IO text laid out the S-C-P paradigm in systematic form, while the Kaysen and Turner (1959) treatise on antitrust provided an extensive application of the paradigm to antitrust. 13 It is noteworthy that Kaysen and Turner's strong structuralist deconcentration remedies for oligopolistic industries rested heavily on Bain's (1954 Bain's ( , 1956 ) finding that economies of scale, though a significant barrier to entry in many industries, did not appear to extend to the sizes of the largest firms in these industries --with the implication that antitrust-forced divestitures would involve little or no sacrifice in productive efficiencies.
It is important to mention that a second strand of IO analysis was developing in the 1950s, under the intellectual leadership of Aaron Director (Peltzman 2005) . This strand was more skeptical of the S-C-P paradigm, more sympathetic to vertical restraints, and generally more supportive of market outcomes. The economics scholars that were associated with Director included Milton Government antitrust victories, and the judicial opinions that supported those victories, in Sherman Section 1 and Section 2 cases in the 1940s and 1950s involving the aluminum industry, the cigarette industry, the movie industry, and the shoe machinery industry reflected these developments of the S-C-P paradigm. Only in the movie industry, however, were there major divestitures as remedies --but these involved vertical separations, not the horizontal divestitures envisioned by 12 See Grether (1970) for a listing. 13 By the late 1950s and early 1960s the S-C-P paradigm was also being applied to regulated industries; see, for example, Meyer et al. (1959) and Caves (1962) . Kaysen and Turner. 14 Further, after being largely dormant because of unduly restrictive wording in its original legislative language, Section 7 of the Clayton Act was revived by the Celler-Kefauver Amendment in 1950. A remarkable two-decade series of government challenges to mergers --mostly victorious --followed, based largely on S-C-P grounds (although some elements of populist fears of bigness were also present).
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The 1960s and early 1970s saw further elaborations of the S-C-P paradigm and more extensive testing of the profitability-concentration relationship, with the inclusion of entry conditions (e.g., Mann 1966; Comanor and Wilson 1967; Preston 1968, 1969; Weiss 1971), 16 advertising (e.g., Wilson 1967, 1974) , foreign trade (e.g., Esposito and Esposito 1971) , the structural conditions on the buyers' side of the market (e.g., Lustgarten 1975), risk (e.g., Bothwell and Keeler 1975) , and the presence of a critical concentration ratio (e.g., White 1976) . 17 But a "Chicago School" counter-revolution was brewing as well, which argued that high concentration might be causing high profit rates, because of economies of scale (contrary to the earlier claims by Bain) . 18 The famous "face-off" of the S-C-P advocates versus the Chicago School in the early 1970s led to the publication of a widely read and cited conference volume .
A further blow to the profit-concentration empirical support for the S-C-P model came in the early 1980s, from two major attacks (Benston 1982; Fisher 1984 Fisher , 1987 on the use and reliability of the accounting data that were used to measure the profit rates used in the studies and on whether relative profit rates were even the appropriate indicators of market power. Profit-based tests of the S-C-P paradigm quickly tailed off, but were soon replaced by price-based studies drawn from individual industries (e.g., as summarized in Weiss 1989; Audretsch and Siegfried 1992) , which tended to show a similar positive relationship between prices and concentration. In addition, empirical studies of auctions indicated that the number of bidders at auctions (which, say, in procurement auctions would be an approximate equivalent to the number of sellers in a market) would have the same type of effect on prices (e.g., Brannman et al. 1987; Brannman and Klein 1992) .
As is discussed in Section IV below, the S-C-P paradigm, with some further economicsbased supplements, became the basis for much of the modern version of the DOJ (and now DOJ-FTC) "Merger Guidelines".
In the area of vertical relationships, too, there was a clash between the "Harvard" tradition and the "Chicago" tradition. The former was suspicious of --and tending to hostility toward --vertical mergers (e.g., between suppliers and customers) and vertical restraints (e.g., tying, bundling, exclusive dealing, territorial sales restraints, resale price maintenance). As will be discussed in Section IV, until the early 1970s antitrust legal decisions were generally hostile toward vertical 18 See Demsetz (1973 Demsetz ( , 1974 .
mergers and vertical restraints, but since then the line of economic reasoning that was championed by the Chicago School has generally prevailed in the courts.
Finally, it is worth noting that a number of IO-oriented professional economics journals came into existence, providing specialized vehicles for the dissemination of the research in IO. Economists' direct involvement in antitrust extends back at least to the beginning of the twentieth century, 22 although their role prior to the 1970s was often limited to simple litigation support --in a sense, as "hewers of wood and haulers of water" --rather than being able to participate in the development of case theories and the formulation of policy. 19 The RJE was originally (1970) the Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, then (1975) the Bell Journal of Economics, and then (1984) the RJE. 20 The RIO was originally the Industrial Organization Review. It became the RIO in 1984. 21 That the appearance of this volume marks a milestone in the relationship of IO to antitrust is highlighted by the fact that there was not even a chapter devoted to antitrust economics in the original two-volume Handbook of Industrial Organization Willig 1989a, 1989b) . There was a section in the second volume that was devoted to "Government in the Marketplace". But all five chapters in that section (Noll 1989; Braeutigam 1989; Baron 1989; Joskow and Rose 1989; and Gruenspecht and Lave 1989) were focused on regulation, not antitrust. When the FTC was created in 1914, its Economic Department (later to become the Economic Division and then the Bureau of Economics, which is the title it retains today) inherited the Bureau of Corporations' research and investigative role, as well as absorbing the specific office accommodations and personnel of its predecessor agency (Scherer 1990 ).
23
At the DOJ the responsibility for antitrust enforcement was placed in a separate division --the Antitrust Division, where that responsibility still rests --only in 1933. 24 Within three years the Division hired its first economists (White 1984) . Until the early 1970s, however, the economics group within the Division was used primarily for data gathering and statistical support in litigation. Posner's (1971, p. 532 ) study of the Division offered the following description: "...the Division's 23 See also Blaisdell (1922) , Henderson (1924) , Stevens (1940), and Mueller (2004) . 24 The DOJ acquired antitrust enforcement authority under the Sherman Act in 1890. Until 1903 enforcement was carried out directly within the Office of the Attorney General, and from 1903-1933 it was carried out within the Office of the Assistant to the Attorney General (White 1984) . According to Edwards (1940) , who cited Thurman Arnold, "the great trust-busting campaign of Theodore Roosevelt [which included the filing and litigation of the Standard Oil, American Tobacco, and other important antitrust cases] was conducted with 7 lawyers and 4 stenographers." economists today are handmaidens to the lawyers, and rather neglected ones at that." Another study of the Division in the early 1970s (Green 1972, p. 128 ) characterized economists there as "...second class citizens. They have little or no say in the type of cases brought, the legal theories used, or the relief sought. In general, they neither conduct long-range studies nor work closely with the policyplanning staff. Mostly they aid attorneys in the preparation of statistical data for trial, and they occasionally testify. They are technicians --"statisticians," as nearly all of the lawyers call them --and act like it." A later study (Weaver 1977) (Kauper 1984) .
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More generally, the 1970s saw an increased involvement of economists in antitrust cases; sometimes the economists' involvements led to publications that reviewed the economic issues of the specific cases in which they had been involved. These writings will be discussed below.
The involvement of economists in antitrust policy, as well as litigation support, took a sharp turn upward in the early 1980s, with the arrival at the Antitrust Division and the FTC of leaders who 27 Kwoka and White (1989 , 2004a , 2009 ) have written about the "revolution" of the application of economics reasoning to antitrust in the 1970s and afterward and enlisted economists who participated in major antitrust cases to write analyses of the cases in which they were involved. Some of the 1970s cases are discussed below. 28 See also Eisner (1991) .
were quite sympathetic to the role and message of microeconomics in the development of antitrust policy and in litigation. 29 For the first time there were FTC Commissioners who were economists, including the Chairman during the first few years of the Reagan Administration. The FTC continued to have an economist as at least one of its five commissioners during 1981-1985 and 1991-1995 29 Also in the late 1970s and the 1980s the number of economics consulting firms that had extensive antitrust litigation support practices increased substantially. Often these firms were led and staffed by "alumni" from the economics staffs of the two enforcement agencies. 30 The cases about which they were writing were, respectively, U.S. v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. et al., 173 F.2d 79 (1949); American Tobacco Co. et al. v. U.S., 147 F. 2d 93 (1944 ), 328 U.S. 781 (1949 and FTC v. Cement Institute et al., 333 U.S. 683 (1948) . See also Adelman (1949b Since the 1970s economists' participation in antitrust litigation has become substantially more frequent (Kovacic 1992; Barnett 2007) , and articles reflecting that participation also continue to appear (see, e.g., Kwoka and White 1989 , 2004a , 2009 ).
IV. Special Achievements
There are three areas of antitrust where economists' achievements in bringing changes in antitrust enforcement and policy are especially noteworthy: merger analysis, vertical relationships and restraints, and predatory pricing.
33 Each will be addressed below.
A. Merger analysis.
Almost all of modern antitrust merger analysis takes as its starting point the DOJ-FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 34 The Guidelines, first published in 1982 35 and subsequently revised in 1987, 1992, and 1997, establish two approaches under which a merger might be deemed to have anti-competitive consequences: "coordinated effects" and "unilateral effects".
33 In addition to the major achievements mentioned in the text, "honorable mention might include: (a) Antitrust economists were among the early advocates of the economic deregulation of securities and banking markets, transportation markets, telecommunications markets, and energy markets; see, for example, Eads (1975) , Mann (1975), and Weiss (1975) ; (b) Antitrust economists have been major advocates for larger fines and the continuation of treble damages in private antitrust suits as instruments for deterrence; see for example White (1986, 1988) ; and (c) Antitrust economists have been major advocates of the repeal of the Robinson-Patman Act; see, for example, Adelman (1949a Adelman ( , 1949b . 34 Accessed at: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm 35 An earlier set of DOJ Guidelines were published in 1968 but proved unsatisfactory and were largely scrapped when the 1982 Guidelines were adopted. The economists at the DOJ played an extensive role in the development of the 1982 Guidelines, especially the market definition paradigm that is discussed below; see White (2000) .
1. Coordinated effects. This is a direct application of the S-C-P model, with the special emphases that were provided by Stigler (1964) . The primary concern under this approach is that oligopolistic sellers will, post-merger, be able implicitly to coordinate their behavior so as to achieve significantly higher prices (or to effect other changes in conduct variables) and higher profits. Seller concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 36 occupies the center stage (as it does in the S-C-P model) for at least two reasons: First, seller concentration is surely the most readily measured structural attribute; and second, the immediate effect of any horizontal merger is to increase seller concentration. The Guidelines indicate specific guideposts as to post-merger concentration (and merger-induced changes in concentration) that will likely trigger close scrutiny and possible intervention.
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The Guidelines also bring into the analysis the other important components of the S-C-P model: conditions of entry; the buyer side of the market; the nature and complexity of the product; the transparency (or opaqueness) of price and other market information; and the antitrust history of the sellers in the market.
A particular problem of implementing merger enforcement prior to 1982 had been the issue of defining the relevant product and geographic markets. The S-C-P model assumes that an appropriate market has been specified, so that the market shares of the leading firms provide a meaningful indication of the likelihood that the firms will collectively exercise market power. But the S-C-P model itself provides no guidance for delineating appropriate markets. 36 The HHI was used as the measure of seller concentration in the Guidelines, rather than the four-firm concentration ratio (which was far more commonly used prior to 1982), partly because it is a more complete measure of the shares of all firms in the market and partly because Stigler (1964) showed that it could serve as an indicator of the ease with which sellers who were trying to coordinate their pricing could distinguish between random market share fluctuations and the market share changes that could occur as a consequence of a surreptitious price cut. 37 Actual enforcement, however, has indicated that substantially higher HHI levels are the de facto thresholds. See Leddy (1986) , Coate (2005) , and Coate and Ulrick (2005) .
The Guidelines addresses this problem in the following way: A relevant market is defined as a product or group of products that are sold by a group of sellers who, if they acted in concert (i.e., as a "hypothetical monopolist"), could achieve a "small but significant and nontransitory increase in price" (SSNIP); that SSNIP is designated as 5% for one year. This is equivalent to defining a relevant market as one in which market power can be exercised (or one in which market power can be enhanced). 38 The smallest group of sellers that satisfies the SSNIP test is usually designated as the relevant market. These principles apply to the determination both of product markets and of geographic markets. The determining factor in the analysis is whether sufficient numbers of buyers would switch away to other sellers (of other goods and/or located in other areas) so as to thwart the price increase.
The logic of this approach follows from the goal of preventing mergers that create or enhance market power. The SSNIP test identifies the smallest group of sellers who could exercise such power. With one exception, the market definition paradigm focuses on sellers (since it is sellers who exercise market power). That exception arises when a group of sellers may be able to practice price discrimination and raise prices significantly for an identifiable group of buyers (defined by a geographic area or by a business function). In such a case, that group of buyers may also be considered to be a relevant market.
This market definition paradigm has proved enduring and has spawned a "mini industry" of econometric efforts in merger cases to estimate "critical" demand elasticities and price-cost margins that would indicate the boundaries of relevant markets. (2003) has indicated, the first suggestion for using this approach to define relevant markets for merger analysis was by . Other efforts at defining markets, such as Elzinga and Hogarty (1973) and Horowitz (1981) , proved less satisfactory than the approach outlined in the text.
Unilateral effects. The 1992 revision to the Merger Guidelines added "unilateral effects"
as a second area of anti-competitive concern with respect to mergers. By this is meant a significant post-merger price increase that could occur solely on the part of the merged entity. This unilateral price increase could occur if the two merging firms produced products that were moderately close substitutes for each other (but not perfect substitutes) and a significant number of the customers of each firm had as their runner-up choice the products of the merger partner. If the products of all other firms were a distant enough third choice for these customers, then the merged entity would likely find a general price increase worthwhile (Ordover and Willig 1993) --and could do even better if it could identify and target these "trapped" customers and thereby practice selective price discrimination against them.
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Note that the anti-competitive effects of this type of merger do not arise because of cooperation or collusion among the firms that compete with the merged entity. Instead the competitive harm occurs because the merged firm is better able to internalize the benefits of a price increase.
Note also that for the unilateral effects analysis the issues of market definition and market shares are largely irrelevant, since what matters is the extent to which customers have the two merging firms as their first and second choices (and the extent to which other firms are a distant third choice). Thus, direct measurements of elasticities and cross-elasticities are crucial; and, again, a mini-industry of empirical estimations for antitrust purposes has arisen. 41 40 Unilateral effects could also occur if a dominant firm merged with one of its rivals, even in a homogeneous goods industry (Stigler 1965) . The post-merger concentration (and merger-induced change in concentration) guideposts would probably be sufficient to catch such mergers; but, to be on the safe side, the Guidelines also indicate that any merger involving a firm that has a market share of 35% or higher will receive special scrutiny.
B. Vertical relationships and restraints. 42 As was noted above, the "Harvard" IO tradition was hostile toward vertical relationships and vertical restraints. The important Kaysen and Turner (1959) Bowman (1957) and Burstein (1960a) argued that tying was often a vehicle for monitoring the buyers' use of the tied product and thus serving as an alternative mechanism for effecting price discrimination (about which the welfare effects are generally 42 An earlier treatment of this topic can be found in White (1989) .
43 "...a flat rule against tying arrangements, regardless of whether they serve a useful purpose, appears justified" (Kaysen and Turner, 1959, p. 159) . 44 At least part of the reason for many economists' harsh view of RPM was the experience of the 1930s, when small retailers (and especially pharmacists) lobbied for protection against "unfair" competition from large chain stores. One legislative reaction, already noted above, was the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, which strengthened the Clayton Act's Section 2 prohibitions on price discrimination (because, the small retailers alleged, the chain stores were extracting discounts from manufacturers that were unavailable to smaller retailers). Another response, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, authorized the states to legalize RPM (which also went by the name "fair trade"), so that the small retailers could convince manufacturers to impose RPM and thus force the chain stores to sell at the same prices as the smaller retailers. 45 It is worth noting that, though Stigler was subsequently associated with the "Chicago School", at the time of the Report he was a Professor at Columbia University. See Peltzman (2007) . 46 White (1989) offers some reasons for these harsh views. ambiguous); Burstein (1960b) argued the same for full-line forcing.
47 Telser (1960) argued that RPM could be a means by which a manufacturer (or other "upstream" entity) could overcome the potential free riding problems that accompany the provision of product information to customers and thereby induce more point-of-sale service from retailers. 48 The free riding argument for RPM has been extended to the provision of other retailer services (Mathewson and Winter 1984; Marvel 1985; Marvel and McCafferty 1984 , 1986 . And free riding problems have been offered as a justification for territorial restraints (White 1981) and for exclusive dealing (Marvel 1982) . Further, there was a widespread "Chicago" attack on the idea that vertical integration could generally have serious anti-competitive consequences. 47 It was also argued that tying and similar vertical restraints could be a way of making sure that the product functioned properly and thus preserving the goodwill of the manufacturer and of dealing with potential free riding problems. 48 See also Bowman (1955) . Telser acknowledged that RPM could be a cover for a retailers' cartel or even for a manufacturers' cartel. What was important, however, was his demonstration that a manufacturer unilaterally might find RPM to be in its interests. 49 See, for example, Bork (1954 Bork ( , 1978 ; Bork and Bowman (1965) ; McGee 1971); Bowman (1973); and Posner (1976) . For a discussion of some of the "counter-revolution" literature that showed that vertical restraints and vertical mergers might not be as benign as the Chicago revolution claimed, see White (1989) . See also Perry (1989) . For a recent summary of the empirical evidence on vertical integration, which finds primarily benign outcomes, see Lafontaine and Slade (2007) . 50 However, in U.S. v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), the Court decided that it was legal for a manufacturer to decide what the retail price of an item should be and then unilaterally decline to deal with any retailer that failed to adhere to that price. The tension between Dr. Miles Medical and Colgate remained a problem until the Leegin decision in 2007, which is mentioned below. In the 1990s, the Court took a step back on tying, in Eastman Kodak Company v. Image
Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) , in which the Court (on a motion for summary judgment) found that Kodak must stand trial on a tying claim. However, later in the decade, in State 54 There were exceptions to the pre-1970s pattern described above. For example, in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) , the Court declined to condemn a requirements contract and declared that exclusive dealing should be judged by a rule of reason. That same year, in U. S. v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 365 U.S. 567 (1961) , the Court affirmed a lower court opinion that allowed tying for a start-up situation. But these and a few other cases were exceptions. The general pattern was as described in the text. Prior to the 1970s, the "treatment of predatory pricing in the cases and the literature...has 55 For a discussion of one worthwhile challenge in the 1980s, see White (1985) . 56 On Microsoft, see Rubinfeld (2004) ; on Dentsply, see Katz (2002 Katz ( , 2009 ).
commonly suffered from two interrelated defects: failure to delineate clearly and correctly what practices should constitute the offense, and exaggerated fears that large firms will be inclined to engage in it." (Areeda and Turner 1975, pp. 697-698 ) Similar defects could be ascribed to allegations of price discrimination (where predation claims were often also lurking, implicitly if not explicitly), as exemplified by FTC enforcement actions and Supreme Court decisions (e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co. et al., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) . Common to enforcement actions and judicial decisions were findings of "pricing below cost" as incriminating behavior, where "below cost" was either vaguely defined or defined as below average costs (which usually also meant using some arbitrary method of distributing joint costs across multiple products, such as using the relative sales revenues of the products as the relative weights).
Academic work to clarify predatory issues, and to cast doubt on the empirical frequency of predation, began at "Chicago" (under Aaron Director's influence) in the late 1950s. 57 The paradigm of envisioning predation as an "investment" (an initial sacrifice) and then a subsequent recoupment period (higher prices permitting a profits return on the initial investment) became clear. Building on this base, Areeda and Turner (1975) offered a powerful critique 58 and a proposal that pricing at or above marginal cost (with average variable cost serving as a proxy for the usually unmeasurable marginal cost) should generally be considered as a "safe harbor" for firms in alleged predatory situations. This subsequently became known as the "Areeda-Turner rule".
59
57 See for example, McGee (1958) and Telser (1966) ; see also Task Force (1969) and Peltzman (2005) . McGee also called into question the factual issue of whether Standard Oil of New Jersey had actually engaged in the predatory practices in the late 19th century that had formed the basis of the Supreme Court's decision finding it guilty of Section 2 violations (U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. et al., 221 U.S. 1 (1911)) and for the company's subsequent forced break-up into a number of constituent companies. 58 Recall that Turner had a Ph.D. in economics as well as a law degree and thus can legitimately be included in this list of economists' accomplishments. 59 The Areeda-Turner rule spawned a flurry of economist critiques and refinements. See, for example, Scherer (1976) , Williamson (1977) , Baumol (1979) , Joskow and Klevorick (1979) It is worth noting that, at about the same time that economists in the antitrust area were clarifying notions of predation, economists in regulatory areas (see, e.g., Baumol 1968; Baumol and Walton 1973) were writing about similar pricing issues in those areas and were nudging regulatory criteria and decisions away from the use of fully distributed cost and instead toward the use of incremental costs.
V. Conclusion
It is clear that the influence of economics on antitrust legal decisions and policy over the past two to three decades has been substantial. This influence has occurred through developments in economics thinking, through the elevation of economists' status and positions at the DOJ and the FTC, and through the wider participation of economists in antitrust litigation generally.
Reasonable economists can differ as to the wisdom of some of these developments and as to the particular stringency of enforcement (or lack thereof) over the past few decades. But few can Brodley and Hay (1981) . 60 For a discussion, see Elzinga (1999) . 61 For a discussion, see Burnett (1999) . 62 As will be argued below, however, the strict investment-plus-recoupment" approach is not sufficiently nuanced, since it does not encompass strategic approaches, such as a company's being willing to absorb a loss through below-marginal-cost pricing in one market, without recoupment, so as to gain a reputation for being aggressive and thereby discouraging entry (or expansion by rivals) in other markets (and thus the recoupment is effectively achieved in those other markets).
argue with the proposition that economists' influence has increased.
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Nirvana has not yet arrived, however. There are at least four areas where further creative economics thinking and influence could encourage better antitrust decisions and policy. First, there is the ongoing dilemma of how to take into account the efficiencies that may accompany a proposed merger. The tradeoffs of the potential welfare losses from heightened market power as against the potential improved efficiencies have been apparent at least since Williamson (1968) . But improved efficiencies are easy to promise and may be difficult to deliver; 64 and "unscrambling the eggs" of a merger a few years after it has been approved and the efficiencies have failed to appear may be difficult or impossible (in addition to the difficulties of even trying to measure whether efficiencies have indeed appeared or not). 63 There is an interesting question --which will be addressed only briefly here --as to why the legal profession --at the enforcement agencies, in private practice, and in the judiciary --were willing to accept the expanded influence of economics and economists on their legal terrain. A few potential (and potentially complementary) explanations can be offered: First, the ideas may well have been too good to be ignored. Second, some agency leaders (e.g., Donald Turner, Thomas Kauper, William Baxter, James Miller, Robert Pitofsky) had come from an academic background and may have been interested in the broader perspective that an academic background often encourages; the same might be said of some influential judges (e.g., Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook, and Stephen Breyer. Also, some of these same individuals had advanced training in economics and/or had advanced economics instincts. Third, especially for lawyers in private practice, the addition of economists in cases meant a greater need for lawyers (and billable hours) to ride herd on these extra participants. Fourth, special programs to improve the economics literacy of the judiciary may have had some effects. Further exploration of these ideas will have to await another day.
an initial investment in below-marginal-cost pricing that will be recouped in higher prices and profits after the target firm departs from the market. Lost in this narrow approach are the larger issues of whether achieving a reputation for below-cost pricing might deter future entry or deter fringe firms that might otherwise be inclined to be mavericks. Achieving this reputation could make the action worthwhile, even if the specific instance under scrutiny would (when the analysis is narrowly confined to only the costs and returns in this instance) not appear to be profitable. 65 Further, applying even this narrow cost-benefit paradigm to non-price behavior has proved difficult. 66 And the issue of bundled discounts, as portrayed in LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (2003) , has roiled antitrust thinking.
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Clear economics thinking can surely help. For example, the concept of "no economic sense" --that a price or non-price action should be condemned if it made no economic sense for the firm undertaking it unless the target firm disappeared from the market or would otherwise be disciplined --is surely one direction that is worth pursuing (although it does not encompass the strategic reputation issues raised above). 68 There may well be other directions that good economics thinking can uncover.
Third, the issue of market definition in Sherman Act Section 2 monopolization cases remains in an unsatisfactory state. This problem is at the center of the so-called "cellophane fallacy": The Supreme Court in U.S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) , decided that the relevant market for analyzing du Pont's market share was "flexible wrapping materials", in which du 65 See, for example, Brodley et al. (2000) . 66 See, for example, the discussion in Edlin and Farrell (2004) . 67 The AMC Report, for example, devoted a surprisingly large amount of space to the decision and to remedies. For a discussion of LePage's, see, for example, Roberts (2009) . 68 See, for example, Werden (2006) and Willig (1981, 1999 ).
Pont's cellophane had less than a 20% share, rather than cellophane itself, which du Pont dominated.
The Court reached this decision by noticing that du Pont was constrained from raising its cellophane prices by the likelihood that it would lose too many customers to sellers of other flexible wrapping materials. The difficulty with this approach (as was pointed out by Stocking and Mueller 1955 ) is that a monopolist of cellophane would be expected to maintain a price that would have exactly this property. Accordingly, this "test" cannot distinguish between a monopolist of cellophane and a competitor in the flexible wrapping materials market. 69 Nevertheless, this test frequently appears in the market definition parts of monopolization decisions.
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The economics textbook notion of what distinguishes a monopoly often stresses the excess profits that are being earned by the monopoly (and this was a large part of Stocking and Mueller's (1955) claim that du Pont did have market power 71 ); but, as was discussed above, since the mid 1980s accounting profits have largely disappeared from economists' efforts to test the S-C-P paradigm, and the same concerns would plague most profits-based efforts at market definition for these Section 2 cases. Clearly, more creative thinking is warranted.
72
Fourth, economists need to lead the effort to make a retrospective assessment of the efficacy of antitrust enforcement, especially merger enforcement. Are the DOJ and FTC drawing the right "lines" in their decisions as to whether to challenge or approve mergers?
69 Although the Court's "test" would appear to be similar to the Merger Guidelines' SSNIP test, the crucial difference is that the SSNIP test is intended to be forward looking, in order to answer the question, "Will this merger create or enhance market power," whereas the Court was applying it in the context of trying to determine whether du Pont already had market power. See White (2007) . 70 See the discussion in White (2008) ; see also U.S. v. Visa and MasterCard, 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (2001), 344 F.3d 229 (2003) . 71 Stocking and Mueller (1955) also argued that du Pont's prices for cellophane did not move in response to changes in other flexible wrapping materials' prices. 72 Some suggestions are offered in White (2008) .
The answer to this question cannot be learned from examining the number of challenges to mergers per year, or examining the characteristics of the mergers that are challenged or of the mergers that are successfully challenged (since one can never know the "counter-factual" with respect to those mergers). But post-merger pricing studies of those mergers that are allowed to proceed --especially those mergers that are "close calls" (as indicated by whether the agencies made a "second request" to ask for additional information from the merger proponents) --should yield useful information. If these studies indicate that post-merger prices have not increased (cet. par.), then merger policy may have been too strict; if the studies instead indicate that post-merger prices have increased significantly, then merger policy has been too lenient. 73 In sum, antitrust economics still has important tasks before it. I hope that there will be supply that will respond to this demand.
